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ABSTRACT ■ Right-wing populism and extremism present challenges
for trade unions throughout Europe. This article reports findings from a
representative survey and group interviews with union members in Germany.
Far right attitudes are neither more nor less widespread among union
members as a whole than in the population at large, but there are
considerable differences within the membership. In particular, skilled workers
as well as middle managers who are union members are significantly 
more inclined to extremist attitudes than non-unionists. The article discusses
these results and presents several conclusions regarding future trade 
union policy.
KEYWORDS: political attitude ■ right extremism ■ trade union membership
Introduction
Within the EU, economic and monetary union, deregulation and cut-
backs in welfare state protection, mass unemployment, workplace
restructuring and relocation as well as the opening of previously protect-
ive borders – especially with the new member states – heavily affect the
lives of the working population. As the European Commission noted
in its 2006 report on industrial relations in Europe, governments and
employers are arguing for widespread ‘modernization’, and increasing
competition necessitates measures to enhance labour market flexibility
and promote atypical forms of employment and work organization. Yet
the Commission concludes (2006b: 16) that ‘increasing labour market
flexibility does not … necessarily lead to higher job quality’ and notes ‘the
potential risks of increased poverty and inequality in working condi-
tions’. For its part, the ETUC (2006) argues that ‘real wages, on average,
are standing still and workers are no longer participating in the fruits of
productivity increases. Many of them are being blackmailed into accept-
ing pay cuts and working longer hours’.
DOI: 10.1177/0959680107086112
European Journal of Industrial Relations
© 2008 SAGE (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore)
Volume 14 Number 1 pp 65–84 www.sagepublications.com
065-084 EJD-086112.qxd  17/1/08  05:11 PM  Page 65
European Journal of Industrial Relations 14(1)
66
The resulting frustration and anxiety among workers can be evidenced
in opinion polls. Eurobarometer surveys consistently place manual and
non-manual workers among those who emphasize the negative aspects of
globalization most strongly (EC, 2003) and who are most worried about
unemployment (EC, 2005). By the end of 2005, an average of 40 percent
of respondents in the EU-15 referred to relocation of production to
countries with lower labour costs; with over 50 percent doing so in
France, Germany, Greece and Belgium (EC, 2006a).
Right-wing extremist and populist movements throughout Europe
have played on these fears, and over the past years have gained influence
and governmental power in the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Italy,
Norway and Denmark (Dörre, 2004). While ‘accelerated modernization’
(Betz, 1993: 420) is quite commonly regarded as a key contributing factor
to this upsurge in right-wing political success, the assumption that
support from those faced with deprivation and marginalization, the
group of so-called ‘modernization losers’ (Klönne, 1989), was the basis
of the renewed upsurge of the right, has been repeatedly questioned.
Such a simplistic linking of socio-economic change and political behav-
iour neglects ‘the dimension of political mediation and the subjective per-
ception of the problems involved’ (Minkenberg, 2000: 182).1
In this vein, recent research on socioeconomic change, individual
reactions and the appeal of the extreme right in eight European countries2
has pointed to the need to examine this issue more deeply and to ‘address
the question as to how radical populism and right-wing extremism in
Europe are linked with socio-economic change’ (de Weerdt et al., 2004: 1).
The researchers reject the simple explanation that modernization losers
are the bedrock of the right; one of the archetypes of right-wing
supporters is the ‘threat to middle-class status and identity, insecurity
through modernization; nostalgia and threat to cultural identity’
(Hentges et al., 2003: 2).
The Problems for Trade Unions
In the face of membership decline, unemployment and job losses in trad-
itional industries, along with corporate restructuring and job competition,
trade unions are struggling to find ways of shoring up their bargaining pos-
itions and revitalizing their power to regulate and negotiate improvements
in wages and working conditions. While attempting to develop strategies to
organize and represent new constituencies, unions are challenged to uphold
the gains and status of their traditional strongholds of membership in manu-
facturing as well. But focusing on the protection of hard-won achieve-
ments for the core membership can encourage nationalistic and xenophobic
overtures, and discrimination against ethnic minorities (Wrench, 2004).
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Thus unions are confronted with the need to develop an understanding of
the roots, forms and appeals of rightist politics and to devise strategies for
combating the spread of right-wing support within their constituency.
While there is significant research on trade union policies toward
racism and xenophobia in Europe (Wrench, 2004), as well as much sur-
vey data on popular attitudes (EUMC, 2005), less attention has been
devoted to their interaction with possible additional factors to the preva-
lence of right-wing extremism in the working population. With its focus
on how negative changes in working life have fostered sympathies among
workers for the political appeal of the right, the SIREN research has
contributed substantially to our understanding of this connection in a
European context. Likewise, our own research with a focus on the
particularities of the historical and political context in Germany has
sought to determine the extent to which trade union members are prone
to far right attitudes. German trade unions have unquestionably been at
the political forefront in condemning all manifestations of right extremism,
but until recently have been ‘terra incognita’ regarding the political
attitudes on right-wing extremism within their own ranks.
Union membership and the existence of a ‘trade union consciousness’
were long considered to have an immunizing effect on such attitudes.
Representative surveys in the 1960s and 1970s (Liepelt, 1967; Sinus, 1981)
confirmed what many union leaders assumed, that ‘union membership
generally immunizes against National Socialism and Fascism’ (Lutz, 1990:
291–2). However, as will be shown below, more recent research has argued
that union members do not differ in their attitudes from non-members and
are just as susceptible to right extremism (the ‘mirror image’ argument).
Nevertheless, neither hypothesis has previously been convincingly tested
empirically on a broadly representative sample of union members.
This article presents results from a two-year research project on trade
union members in Germany and right extremism.3 The research was con-
ducted between 2003 and 2005, a period of economic stagnation, down-
sizing, wage cuts and union membership losses (Fichter, 2005). It was
based on a representative survey of members and non-members, supple-
mented by ten group interviews with nearly 60 union officials. Our
original hypothesis was that the mirror image argument was invalid
because union members have a definable ‘trade union belief system’: they
become members because they hold particular beliefs and values as-
sociated with trade unionism. Yet under the threat of unemployment,
workplace restructuring and job uncertainty, this consciousness would
necessarily reflect contradictory attitudes and show potential cleavages.
Thus we sought to find causes of right extremism peculiar to union
members, and expected to find some members or groups of members to
be relatively immune to right extremism, while others would prove more
vulnerable.
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The DGB and Right Extremism
In his opening speech to the national congress in June 1998, the President
of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB, German Trade Union
Confederation) declared that ‘the DGB and its member unions will not
tolerate anti-Semitism, racism or xenophobia. Indeed, everywhere and
unrelentingly we will use every means at our disposal to combat such
behaviour’. This reflected the degree to which union leaders perceived
a growing need for a more vigorous defence of democratic values. Research
on the electoral basis of the extreme right-wing party Die Republikaner
(Roth, 1989; Stöss, 1990) along with studies of attitudes of young trade
unionists (Held et al., 1996) had given notice to the unions that member-
ship was not a reliable shield against extreme right attitudes. While the
DGB was relieved that only 3.3 percent of the electorate actually voted for
one of these right-wing parties in elections later that year, a more detailed
statistical breakdown indicated that there was indeed a cause for alarm:
27 percent of all 18- to 24-year-old union members in eastern Germany had
voted for such a party; and in western Germany the figure was 10 percent.
Such results led the DGB to create a high-level Commission on Right
Extremism. Its report, published in 2000, concluded that opinions and
attitudes of union members mirrored those of the non-union population.
Since unions do not exist in a vacuum, it was not surprising that xenophobic
and racist attitudes were just as virulent within the membership as in the
general population.
For what reason should union members in particular be immune to the
presentation of foreigners in the press as ‘the problem’? And why should
union members have faith in government pronouncements which claim
that Germany is not a land of immigration, when such a denial is an obvi-
ous contradiction to their everyday experiences? (DGB, 2000).
Thus the report acknowledged the existence of right-wing attitudes
among the members and it advanced some general explanations for this
phenomenon, including the possibility that union acceptance of the argu-
ment that Germany must be more competitive (Standort Deutschland )
played into the hands of the far right by providing arguments for the
marginalization of foreigners. But in support of its ‘mirror-image’ con-
clusions regarding member attitudes, it had only limited empirical
research to draw on and could thus offer little in the way of new insights.
Research Design and Methodology
The aim of our research was to fill this gap by establishing the extent
of right extremism in the membership, its constituting factors, and how
right extremism relates to other attitudes and beliefs which we expected
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to find among unionists. The survey was conducted in March and
April 2003 and consisted of 4008 telephone interviews, each some 30
minutes in length. Our questionnaire was constructed with the depend-
ent variable of far right attitudes (see below) and four independent vari-
ables of socio-political orientation (SPO), socio-economic status (SES),
personality structure and fundamental political value orientations. The
completed sample included 2006 union members and 2002 non-unionists,
equally divided between western and eastern Germany. Over 90 percent
of the unionists were members of a DGB union; the others belonged
to smaller organizations such as the DBB (German Civil Service
Confederation) or the CGB (Christian Trade Union Confederation).
In order to be compatible with the mainstream of research on
right extremism in Germany and to promote comparativeness, we chose
to use a definition of far right attitudes developed by a working party of
social scientists recognized as the leading specialists in Germany in this
field:
Right extremism is an attitude pattern which is constructed upon
opinions of human inequality. These are expressed in the political sphere
by an affinity to dictatorial forms of government, chauvinistic attitudes
and the belittling of the harmfulness or even the justification of 
National Socialism. In the social sphere right extremism is characterized
by anti-Semitism, xenophobism and social Darwinism. (Kreis, 2007: 12)
This definition was operationalized by formulating five statements for
each of six different dimensions. Interviewees were asked to respond to
these 30 statements on a scale of one to seven, with seven indicating com-
plete agreement. Thus within each dimension, the scale of possible responses
ranged from five (5  1) to 35 (5  7), with a mean value of 20. Values of 21
and above were classed as indicating agreement with right extremism.
To illustrate the kind of statements used, one example is presented for
each dimension:
Advocating an authoritarian dictatorship (Dimension 1) ‘What Germany
needs now is a single strong political party which represents the collective
will of the people.’
Chauvinism (Dimension 2) ‘The interests of our country need to be
uncompromisingly and energetically represented in dealings with other
countries.’
Xenophobia (Dimension 3) ‘The large number of foreigners in the Federal
Republic shows that we have been infiltrated to a dangerous degree.’
Anti-Semitism (Dimension 4) ‘We have to defend ourselves against the
way the Jews continually use the guilty conscience of the Germans.’
Social Darwinism (Dimension 5) ‘There is worthy and worthless human
existence.’
Trivialization of criticism of National Socialism (Dimension 6) ‘National
socialism had its good sides too.’
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Table 1 presents the percentage of those respondents whose scores
indicated agreement on each dimension. This gives a first indication
of the overall extent of both similarities and differences between
members and non-members and between eastern and western
respondents.
Following completion of the survey we conducted a series of group-
based qualitative interviews. Our intention was to have active trade
unionists provide their views on the statistical results, in particular those
attitudinal combinations which we found difficult to explain with quan-
titative methods. The quantitative findings gave us a ‘directional thrust
and set focal points’ (Birsl et al., 1999: 97) for our qualitative research,
which involved 10 group discussion interviews with trade union mem-
bers. The 58 participants included nine women, seven migrants, 22 resi-
dents of eastern Germany and five retirees. Six of the eight DGB unions
were represented. With the exception of the retirees, all of the partici-
pants were either salaried officials or held elected non-paid positions in a
union or works council. Two researchers were present at each session to
give thematic impulses and document the proceedings.
The seven themes, drawn from the survey findings, helped structure
the discussions and presented the participants with a clear statement
of the purpose of our research. The participants were asked to respond
by discussing their own views and those of their colleagues. Following
each two-hour session, we paraphrased the statements from the
tapes and coded them according to a detailed list of topics relating to
the following categories: right extremism, affinity to or rejection of
right extremism, role and situation of the unions, union membership
and non-members, economic changes and globalization, and politics in
general.
TABLE 1. Agreement with Extreme Right-Wing Statements on Each
Dimension (%)
Members Non-members All
respondents
All West East All West East
Dimension 1 18 17 26 20 16 33 19
Dimension 2 31 31 30 32 31 36 32
Dimension 3 23 20 36 26 23 40 26
Dimension 4 23 24 19 22 22 24 23
Dimension 5 12 11 16 13 12 20 13
Dimension 6 28 29 24 29 29 28 29
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Selected Findings
The following summary focuses on those findings which are particularly
important for the future of the German unions and their approaches to
dealing with far right attitudes in their membership.
In regard to the union membership as a whole, our survey revealed
only an insignificant difference in the percentage of far right attitudes
between members (19.1) and non-members (20). At this level, the mirror-
image hypothesis advanced by the DGB Commission confirmed: as a
whole, union members are no more (and no less) prone to far right atti-
tudes than their non-member counterparts.
However, our findings reveal significant differences between and with-
in relevant socio-economic groups. In western Germany (the pre-1990
Federal Republic) we found only a negligible statistical difference in far
right attitudes between members (18.4 percent) and non-members (17.8
percent). In contrast, in eastern Germany (the former German
Democratic Republic), the overall incidence of far right attitudes was
significantly higher (27 percent), but we found that union members are
relatively less susceptible (22.5 percent), while far right responses came
from over 28 percent of the non-members.
Socio-economic Status and Far Right Attitudes
As can be seen in Table 2, labour force participants are generally far less
susceptible to right extremism than non-participants. Second, unskilled
and skilled workers and middle managers are more likely to entertain
such attitudes if they are union members than if they are not: indeed non-
skilled workers who are union members are almost twice as likely as
non-members to have such attitudes (34 as against 18 percent). The same
holds for organized middle managers (14 as against 7 percent). And
TABLE 2. Extreme Right Attitudes by Labour Force Status (%)
Members Non-members
Labour force
participants 17 12
Non-active 25 28
Unemployed 25 34
Unskilled 34 18
Skilled 20 18
White-collar 10 12
Middle managers 14 7
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skilled workers, who make up 25 percent of the union membership, are
slightly more likely than their non-union counterparts to adopt such
positions (20 as against 18 percent).
For the economically active respondents we constructed a three-strata
model based on income and level of education.4 Our composite model
combines rankings on the two dimensions as follows:
lower stratum: low  low, low  medium;
middle stratum: medium  medium, low  high;
upper stratum: medium  high, high  high.
Table 3 shows how the various job classifications and status groups are
distributed across the strata. Interestingly, the lower stratum represents
44 percent of all respondents, but only about one-third of union mem-
bers. Thirty-two percent of all respondents were from the middle stra-
tum compared to nearly one half of the union members (45 percent). In
the upper stratum the figures are 24 percent and 22 percent. From this it
can be seen that the union membership is strongly concentrated in the
middle stratum. Expressed in terms of labour force status groups, we find
mostly skilled workers and middle or line managers among union mem-
bers in the middle stratum.
How does socioeconomic status interact with union membership to
influence the prevalence of far right attitudes? Among union members,
those in the lower stratum have a significantly higher propensity towards
right extremism than those in the middle and upper strata. However,
when we compare union members and non-members within each of the
three strata, we find that the lower stratum is obviously much more sus-
ceptible to right extremism, members (28 percent) somewhat less than non-
members. This is consistent with findings on ethnic exclusionism in
Europe (EUMC, 2005). In the upper stratum, we find a considerably
lower incidence of far right attitudes. In this group, unionists are slightly
less extremist in their attitudes (6 percent) than non-members (8 percent).
Of particular interest are the percentages of far right attitudes found in
the middle stratum. Here, the proportion of extremist union members
(19 percent) is in line with the overall incidence among trade unionists.
TABLE 3. Membership Groups and Non-members by Stratum (%)
Officialsa Active Passive All Non-
members members members members
Lower stratum 20 30 35 33 46
Middle stratum 43 46 46 45 30
Upper stratum 37 24 19 22 24
aBoth paid and lay union representatives.
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But non-members in this stratum are significantly less prone to agreeing
to far right statements (13 percent).
Socio-political Orientations and Far Right Attitudes
Up to this point the findings as presented have been based on socio-
economic categories. And indeed, the literature on far right attitudes has
often argued that increasing precariousness of social status and employ-
ment fosters the growth of such attitudes (Dörre, 2004). In contrast,
however, other findings (Decker and Brähler, 2006; Heitmeyer, 2006)
show that while socio-economic factors are certainly relevant, they pro-
vide only a partial and sometimes even an inconsistent and contradictory
explanation for the endorsement of such views. Instead, the way in which
individuals deal with their socio-economic situation, broadly labelled as
socio-political orientations, has far-reaching explanatory relevance and
significance. These orientations include personality traits such as authori-
tarianism or self-confidence, values, and general social and political view-
points. In our evaluation of the survey data, two distinct and very broadly
defined patterns of orientation emerged: one marked by democratic
convictions and one dominated by authoritarian convictions. Again,
while ‘democratic’ and ‘authoritarian’ include particular and distinct
political views, they are used here in a much broader sense to refer to
general socio-political orientations. We were able to show empirically
that the stronger the former (democratic orientation), the less likely a per-
son will harbour far right attitudes. Likewise, persons with authoritarian
convictions have a clearly positive attitude toward right extremism, espe-
cially when such convictions are reinforced by ‘gut reactions’ of frustra-
tion and anxiety, triggering disaffection and disdain for the political
process and the socio-economic and political system as a whole.
Referring again to our model of socio-economic strata, union members
from all three strata have a stronger participatory orientation than non-
members. From this we could assume that union members are more
resistant to right extremism than non-members. However, a differenti-
ation along socio-economic lines and a comparison with levels of disaffec-
tion and alienation from the political system shed a different light on this
phenomenon.
Lower stratum: Here we find a comparatively low level of participatory
orientations, an especially problematical social status and strong disaffec-
tion with the political system (‘gut rejection’ attitudes). However, union
members with a participatory orientation of 13 percent are somewhat more
democratically oriented and are less concerned about the precariousness of
their social status than their non-union counterparts (10 percent).
Upper stratum: Attitudes in this category reflect relatively strong ‘gut
rejection’ orientations. However, members are less prone to embrace far
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right attitudes than non-members because of their much stronger partici-
patory values (45 as against 28 percent).
Middle stratum: The social status of members in this category is less
endangered than that of non-members. And members have a stronger
democratic and participatory orientation than non-members (25 as
against 16 percent). However, their ‘gut rejection’ disposition is extremely
strong. Union members are to a much greater extent than non-members
highly dissatisfied with the political and socio-economic situation, they
show a tendency to be indiscriminately critical, assuming a position of
‘fundamental opposition’.
Again, it must be emphasized that support for far right positions cannot
be measured solely on the basis of socio-economic status, nor do socio-
political orientations alone provide a sufficient explanation of this phenom-
enon. Our findings have clearly shown, for example, that there is no
deterministic relationship between the negative effects of socio-economic
change (modernization losers) and the endorsement of far right pos-
itions. The problems associated with socio-economic change are a con-
tributing factor, but certainly not capable of explaining right extremism
in full. Together, however, socio-economic status and socio-political
orientations form a powerful set of indicators from which we can draw
insights regarding the context, the content and the distribution of far
right attitudes among union members.
Disaffection among Middle-Stratum Union Members
In our model, the middle stratum includes 43 percent of all trade union
officials and persons in this classification can not be generally categorized
among the ‘modernization losers’. And yet, one-half of all union mem-
bers with far right attitudes are from this stratum. Stated differently, this
group with far right attitudes comprises 10 percent of the whole mem-
bership. Since the difference between members and non-members in the
upper and lower strata regarding such attitudes is relatively small, we
focus on the middle stratum in search of reasons for union members
being more vulnerable to right extremism than non-members from the
same socio-economic group.
It is among members from the middle stratum that we found ‘gut
rejection’ positions, a fundamental disaffection from the political system,
to be especially virulent. Apparently, they stem from changes and uncer-
tainties which these union members – in particular those in western
Germany – perceive as already or potentially endangering their social
status and achievements. The success story of the Federal Republic
through to the 1980s was marked by the input and recognition achieved
by union officials, active union members and works council members as
the backbone of a successful integration of the working class and an
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income and labour policy of increasing affluence. Skilled industrial
workers, a high percentage of who have long represented the core of
union membership contributed strongly to the affluence of the Federal
Republic, and they profited from the prosperity of the ‘German model’
(Markovits, 1982). Warnings of the status insecurity of this segment of
the labour force (Herrigel, 1996) now seem to be more realistic in the face
of globalization, labour market deregulation, wage dumping and losses of
union power and workplace representation. This group is especially sensi-
tive to the loss of union power and the dismantling of their own success
story. Among these union members we found the greatest concentration of
respondents with strong anxieties about losing their hard-won social status
as employees and their recognized political status as union members.
Still, the question remains as to why a notable percentage of this group
harbours far right sentiments in the face of such problems. A closer look
at the insights we gained from the group discussions suggests additional
explanations for this phenomenon.
Far Right Sentiments from the Group Discussions
While the survey turned up no evidence of the existence of a ‘trade union
belief system’ in the membership, we did find that union officials and
activists generally embraced a common understanding of ‘unionism’.
And this was confirmed by the group discussions. Among our partici-
pants we found that in particular, the principles of equality, solidarity,
internationalism as well as codetermination and participation clearly can
be designated as ‘immunizers’ against right extremism as long as such
beliefs are steadfast and reliable interpreters of reality. However, the
increasing economic and political challenges facing unions have weak-
ened their capacity to fulfil their proclaimed role and goals. The response
of a considerable number of members is disappointment and frustration,
which can express itself in a variety of ways, including resigning from
membership, a lowering of expectations (concession bargaining), or in
demands that ‘the union’ protest adverse policies more vehemently, or
even in a willingness to entertain the simple solutions of the far right
(a stronger state, a strong leader). As such, it is not the principles of the
‘belief system’ themselves which open the door for far right attitudes;
rather it is their negation and the feeling of individual and collective power-
lessness in the context of developments which erode the achievements of
the ‘German model’. The union ‘belief system’ is open to far right atti-
tudes because its programmatic assurances of protection and collective
solidarity seem hollow when challenged by employers and by politically
instrumented changes to the system. Three examples from the group
discussions will help illustrate this.
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Wage Dumping and ‘Black Market’ Competition
‘Foreigners’ and the prevalence of xenophobia are an omnipresent issue
in the world of work in Germany, and the group discussions reflected
this quite clearly. Although the German unions have taken a clear stand
against scapegoating foreigners,5 the increasing competition for jobs as
firms downsize or relocate production outside Germany together with
the opening of the German labour market within the EU has heightened
aggression against foreigners and such statements as ‘the foreigners are
stealing our jobs’ have become commonplace in certain sectors of the
economy such as construction and services.
I know that this is a delicate topic in the construction union [IG BAU],
for example, in Cottbus [on the Polish border]; it is virtually impossible
to hold a reasonable discussion on this topic because the membership is
so adamant about their position: the foreigners are stealing our jobs!
Others in the discussion pointed out that this is certainly not the official
position of the union, and that the presence of foreign workers in
Germany is not the cause of the economic problems. Most of the partici-
pants from private enterprises pointed out that the workforce where
they were employed was multinational. At work, they could vouch for the
fact that there was no inherent sign of xenophobia. All nationalities –
Germans and foreigners who live in Germany with extended work
permits – cooperated well together:
I have worked in the mine since 1971, together with Turks, Italians,
French, Spaniards, Swiss – you name it, from every country around us.
And I never felt that any of them was taking anything away from us, 
any particular job or employment in general. Everyone, independent 
of their nationality, who lives in Germany, could apply for the job and
get it.
On the other hand, some of the discussants pointed out that when job
cuts were announced, or a particular department was scheduled to be
outsourced, ‘foreigners’ became an issue which divided the workforce.
As reported by our participants, some of whom became quite emotional
while discussing the problem, the restlessness and uncertainty was even
greater when jobs were to be relocated to a foreign country. And there
was a general current of feeling unjustly treated and at a disadvantage
when it was necessary to compete with foreigners working but not living
in Germany. Here is an example, in this case from a worker who had
immigrated from Poland years before.
We Germans, we live here and pay our rent and our taxes. And when my
brother comes here from Poland, where he lives with his family, he works
here for two months, lives with me, makes money and lowers the market
price with his €5 or 6 an hour. Then he goes back home with his earnings,
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stays for a month and then comes back again. And that’s why I don’t
want him working here.
Another discussant had this to say:
A construction site in Dortmund, the Holzmann Co. has hired 300
Romanians for €3 an hour. The union knows that, and the mayor knows
that. They’re ruining the market, and who’s to blame? It’s the politicians
at the top.
The dilemma for these unionists is evident: how can the high level of
union wage standards and working conditions be protected? Combating
non-regulated work and wage dumping is their obvious answer, but this
puts the union in a potentially anti-foreigner position since this kind of
work is usually done by foreign workers. For the German construction
workers union (IG BAU) the issue is the protection of standards from
any undercutting, regardless of the nationality or ethnic background of
the perpetrator. The union has rejected the notion of priority treatment
for Germans in favour of protecting persons in the labour force living in
Germany. But this is an argument which is not readily shared by all, and
union activities to report wage dumping in cooperation with public
authorities have been roundly criticized by anti-racist and foreigner sup-
port groups. But it seems to have the full support of union officials and
many members. Nevertheless, some unionists were fully aware that
union arguments for organizing solidarity to protect nationally achieved
labour standards were being undermined by globalization and labour
migration, opening the way for the spread of xenophobic and far right
attitudes.
The Loss of Security, Solidarity and Social Status
In their struggle for better wages and working conditions and in their
demands for worker participation, unions awaken expectations. In times
of crisis or restructuring, those expectations may even grow, although
unions are often less able to fulfill them. Disappointment and a feeling of
helplessness may spread:
Unemployment, the growing power of companies just from one day to
the next to say ‘Pack your belongings; we’re closing down this plant.’
Why is that possible? Where does that leave me? My existence is threat-
ened! This is the kind of feeling that many have. Even those with secure
jobs feel that they could be the next in line.
Competition is growing – fewer jobs, more competition.
In the group discussions there was a broad consensus that conditions
were generally worse today than in former times and that they were
worsening. While the conclusions drawn from that attitude covered a
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wide range of positions, our findings suggest that some of the disap-
pointed members look for the fulfilment of their expectations in far right
arguments and solutions. ‘Politics’ in general, that is, the political estab-
lishment – and in particular social democracy (SPD) – is blamed for the
worsening situation of working people and for not upholding the prin-
ciples of social justice: ‘We have a “red” government which is ignorant
regarding basic social policy’. Repeatedly, we heard the argument that the
demise of the SPD as the political arm of the labour movement defending
social rights, and the failure of the unions and their supporters to mount
an effective opposition, had led to political disaster, resulting in a growing
‘wish for a strong hand to bring an end to the chaos’. Dissatisfaction with
the outcomes from the political process is transformed into dissatisfaction
with the processes themselves. Politics is not only socially unjust, it is also
chaos under the label of democracy. Arguments such as these which result
from disappointment link social justice to ‘order’, which can only be
restored via authoritarian means. When democratic participation is dys-
functional because it is incomplete, and when political alternatives are
unavailable in the party system,6 then only a ‘strong hand’ would be cap-
able of restoring order and ensuring social justice.
Such utterances reveal that social justice, one of the principles of a
union belief system, can provide an opening for far right attitudes in the
guise of an authoritarian state, when both the government and the unions
fail to meet the expectations of union members in protecting jobs, pro-
viding socio-political correctives to the dynamics of capitalism and guar-
anteeing a measure of social security. Among union members we found
such attitudes expressed in terms of the spread of existential fears and the
disappearance of any hope for collective interest representation and
organized solidarity.
People have recognized who really runs things in this country, it’s the
employers who are in charge, not the politicians. The employers can do
what they want. Whether they operate in this country or move their
plants to somewhere else, that’s not their worry. And that’s why people
long for the strong man who will tell the employers what they’re
supposed to do.
People are not well off, and everyone blames someone else, while hop-
ing that someone will come along and solve their problems.
What is especially notable about these kinds of attitudes is that they are
not only found among so-called modernization losers or the downwardly
mobile, a finding which the SIREN project also confirmed (Flecker and
Hentges, 2004). Even our discussants from Volkswagen, the epitome of a
social partnership employer, expressed deep-felt uncertainty over the
future of their jobs. The core of union membership, the better paid
skilled workers from large industrial plants, is no longer particularly
resistant to far right interpretations of the current situation.
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Politically Active Trade Unionism
A belief in politically active unionism, incorporating the idea of the
union as a community of common values, is not shared extensively in the
membership, even among those generally supportive of the other elem-
ents of a union belief system. Two different positions showed up in the
group discussions. When the participants were asked to comment on our
overall finding that union members are just as prone to far right attitudes
as non-members, some reacted with surprise and disbelief; others saw
nothing unusual in this result.
The latter group regarded unions as having the purely economic func-
tion of reducing competition among workers in the labour market.
Joining a union for this reason would not be dependent on a person’s
political persuasion or on the union’s political programme. In contrast,
those who understood union membership to reflect a workers’ move-
ment mentality and a common political value orientation (in essence, leftist),
were shocked by our finding.
Moreover, among the supporters of politically active unionism were
persons with what we call a ‘traditional socialist’ attitude pattern: sup-
port for nationalizing large corporations, for the continuing importance
of class conflict between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, and for the belief
that there can be no real democracy in capitalism. Perhaps surprisingly
to some, we found that such an attitude pattern did not necessarily
immunize against far right attitudes but could correlate positively with
them.
In the group discussions we found that especially the younger union-
ists randomly selected individual phenomena when referring to common
historical traits between leftist and rightist movements. In reference to
classic totalitarianism one of the participants said that both the left and
the right had the orientation to a ‘strong man’ and a ‘strong state’ in com-
mon. And nationalization of key enterprises, several argued, seemed to
fit well to rightist demands that the government protect jobs for
Germans.
From an historical perspective, right extremist, fascist and national
‘socialist’ movements were able to use elements of Marxist social critique
for their own purposes. And the experience of a Soviet-style dictatorship
in East Germany has heightened the impression of similarity for many,
especially because after 1989 the theoretical tradition of democratic-
humanitarian socialism has been unable to present a convincing political
alternative. Instead, the far right has used elements of leftist political
demands such as the protection and maintenance of the welfare state to
join the protests against labour market reforms pursued by both the
Schröder coalition (SPD–Green Party, 1998–2005) and the current SPD–
CDU coalition.
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Recommendations for Trade Union Policy
How might unions – not only in Germany – respond to the prevalence
of far right attitudes among the membership? An important finding from
our research is that factors of socio-economic status alone cannot explain
the incidence and distribution of such attitudes. There is a clear indication
that democratic convictions (strong political consciousness and self-
confidence, democratic orientations, libertarian positions) have a noticeably
positive impact on preventing the spread of far right attitudes. As such, it
seems imperative that unions develop a strategic response to right extrem-
ism which can build on this insight.
Far right attitudes among union members are a reflection of their under-
standing of extensive socio-economic changes and of the crisis in which
trade unions currently find themselves. Right extremists are moving to the
fore with their own arguments, while union arguments are apparently not
reaching a sizeable portion of the membership. If unions do not effectively
contest the conventional wisdom that ‘there is no alternative’ to insecurity
and job losses because of the pressures of competitiveness, members are
likely to be susceptible to far right positions. Their frustrations and anxieties
are understandable, and right extremism has an appeal as a functional means
of dealing with problems at work. If a solidaristic and democratic handling
of problems and conflicts is to be achieved, a union strategy needs to be
devised which builds on understanding and handling the fears and anxieties
raised by threats of unemployment, outsourcing and wage undercutting.
The way in which these and other political and socio-economic issues such
as globalization and relocation are analysed, interpreted, and put in a dif-
ferentiated context of union strategy will determine the ability of the unions
to prevent the spread of far right attitudes among the members.
Over the past years, the DGB and its member unions have launched a
wide range of activities including involvement in European networks,
demonstrations, campaigns, educational projects and workplace agree-
ments designed to combat xenophobia and right extremism – but not as
a particular problem of their own membership. To address this issue
specifically, we regard the following insights from our research as essen-
tial ingredients for developing a successful union strategy:
Trade unions need to represent a clear set of values, such as social justice and
democracy, for which they are willing to fight, if they want to succeed in
combating far right attitudes in their membership. Posturing merely as a labour
market cartel or as an organization to service its members as customers is
insufficient. ‘The struggle for trade union organization is thus a struggle for the
hearts and minds of people; in other words, a battle of ideas.’ (Hyman, 1999: 4)
Trade unionism which embraces a ‘community of values’ is also des-
tined to encourage and enable participation in the organization. This is
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not only an issue for union educational departments. For some German
union officials, caught in a web of organizational demands, promoting
participation either leads to chaos or is too time-consuming (a passive
membership is easier to handle). But in our study, characteristics such as
initiative and participation appeared as especially effective inhibitors of
right extremism. Members who have a chance at their workplace or in the
union to make a difference or to contribute to achieving a common goal
generally reject far right positions. Only strong individuals are capable of
solidarity and only solidaristic individuals are strong.
Because the readiness on the part of union members to embrace right
extreme positions results from their fears and anxieties about their future
livelihood, a trade union strategy for combating right extremism belongs
in the mainstream of union policy and activities. German unions could
learn from the positive experiences of British trade unions in addressing
racism through proactive policies (Wrench, 2004).
Our study showed that there is a definite affinity between authoritar-
ian character traits, rigid thinking and far right attitudes. Rigidity is the
readiness to seek ‘simple’ solutions to complex problems and issues, and
to think in terms of accepting developments as being unavoidable neces-
sities and the impossibility of alternatives. Unions need to show the way
to more differentiated approaches and individual capacity for judgement.
Finally, far right and right-wing populist movements and organizations
exist in many other EU member states as well as Germany. As research on
trade union policies toward the challenges of cross-border labour migra-
tion and the relocation of jobs in other EU member states has shown,
responses may vary over time, depending on the particular local and
national context (Martens, 1999; Penninx and Roosblad, 2000; Wrench,
2004). But in the light of the Europeanization of the market and the import-
ance of strengthening democratic institutions in the EU as well as fur-
thering the development of European-wide regulations for decent working
conditions, there is a growing need for increased cross-border cooperation
and the exchange of ideas by unions, both in combating the sources of right
extremism and in furthering a democratic political culture in Europe.
Above all, the goal of counteracting right extremism should be to
expose such a position as a helpless flight from responsibility, reflective
judgment and freedom, while at the same time promoting collective,
solidaristic and democratic involvement as the better alternative. The
challenge will be to mobilize trade union members with their generally
strong democratic and participatory traits on behalf of this endeavour.
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NOTES
1 See also Betz (1993: 421), who argues that the political ambiguities of right-
wing programmes are the result of an attempt to forge ‘an alliance between
losers and winners of the present acceleration of the modernization process’.
2 See EU research project SIREN (Socio-Economic Change, Individual
Reactions and the Appeal of the Extreme Right) [http://www.siren.at/en].
3 The final report, authored by M. Fichter, J. Kreis, R. Stöss and B. Zeuner, is
available in German at [http://www.polwiss.fu-berlin.de/projekte/gewrex/
gewrex_anfang.htm].
4 The classification criteria are: monthly personal net income of under €800,
€800 to €1499, and €1500 and above; and low, medium or high level of
general education.
5 Though the DGB backed the German government’s restrictions on the free
movement of labour from the 10 new member states in central and eastern
Europe in 2004.
6 The project survey and group interviews were completed before a new leftist
political party Wahlalternative für Sozialgerechtigkeit (WASG) was founded.
In the Federal elections of 2005, the WASG achieved notable support in
areas in which the right extreme parties had been expected to do well.
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